This paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country. In particular, we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women's autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband's farm. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women. Using data from rural Bangladesh, empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per say but employment outside their husbands' farms that contributes to women's autonomy. The data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy.
Introduction
In recent decades, particularly since the Beijing Women's conference in 1995, empowering women in the developing world has become a primary policy goal. Quite apart from being an important goal in its own right, increased female autonomy has been shown to confer other benefits like long-term reduction in fertility, higher child survival rates, and allocation of resources in favour of children in the household. 1 There has been much debate in the women and development literature on how to empower women, with the debate often centering on their participation in economic activities and access to financial resources. That greater labour market access for women increases their autonomy has almost come to be taken as a stylized fact in development economics (World Bank 1995) . Much earlier, Engels (1884) had argued that participation in the labor market is essential if women are to be emancipated from the servitude in which the patriarchal family held them. Apart from the substantial anecdotal evidence on this issue, numerous case studies suggest that a woman's access to employment outside the home increases her domestic decision-making power and control over resources. 2 Others have emphasized the role of access to resources such as land and credit. Agarwal (1994) , in particular, has argued that ownership of assets would be a very efficacious avenue in developing countries. In economies that are largely agrarian, land is the most productive asset and access to it enhances women's autonomy for many reasons. 3 In a similar vein, others have demonstrated a link between pre-marital assets and women's decision-making power. 4 Also, there is 1 For the link to fertility and child mortality, among many others, see, Dyson and Moore (1983) , Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) , Mason (1987) , Hogan et al (1999) , and Eswaran (2002) . Many studies find that childrens' well-being is strongly correlated with women's income relative to men's, where women consistently devote a higher proportion of their income to family needs than do men. Refer to a survey by Strauss and Beegle (1996) for studies that find evidence from Cameroon, India, Kenya, Malawi, and the Dominican Republic. In the same vein, Thomas (1990) finds that unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on a family's health than when under the control of the father; for child survival probabilities, the marginal effect is roughly twenty times larger.
2 See, for example, Acharya and Bennet (1982) for Nepal, Finlay (1989) for the Dominican Republic, Safa (1992) for the Carribean, and Ecevit (1991) for Turkey.
3 See also Boserup (1970) and Dyson and Moore (1983) , among several others. 4 See, for example Kabeer (1999) and Folbre (1984) .
some evidence that access to credit programs has a positive effect on female empowerment (see, for example, Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996). 5 Female autonomy is typically defined as the ability of women to make choices/decisions within the household relative to their husbands'. The whole question of autonomy does not, of course, arise if the household is viewed as a monolithic unit, with a single decision maker. However, there is now ample evidence to reject this unitary model of the household. 6 Accordingly, Folbre (1986) , Sen (1990) and several others have suggested that, instead of being atomistic, the household in developing countries is better modelled as conflictual. The main theoretical contribution of economists to the literature on female empowerment has been through bargaining theory [McElroy and Horney (1981) , Manser and Brown (1980) pioneered the approach; Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 ) presents a different approach to collective decision-making]. 7 Bargaining models have demonstrated that women can be empowered by improving their threat options-which captures the level of wellbeing they could assure themselves of in the event bargaining breaks down with their spouses. An improvement in women's threat option delivers to them, in standard bargaining models, an improvement in their wellbeing within the cooperative equilibrium.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relative importance of various factors contributing to female empowerment. We are particularly concerned with the relative roles of ownership of assets and access to labor markets in facilitating female autonomy, something that Bangladeshi data allows us to investigate. This distinction is not often made in the literature and we first theoretically model this in order to structure the empirical analysis. This paper brings to bear a theoretical argument to shed light on this issue and marshals some empirical evidence in its support. 5 An additional contributing factor is, of course, the role of social norms and cultural practices and how these interact with these more economic factors. 6 Refer to the work of Thomas (1990) , Browning et. al. (1994) , Hodinott and Haddad (1995) , Gray(1998) , Lundberg et al. (1997) and Thomas (1994) , among others. 7 See Bergstrom (1996) for an overview of models of allocation within the family.
Any resolution of this question clearly requires the identification of the threat scenario relevant to developing countries. As Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have argued, divorce is not necessarily the most appropriate characterization of the break down of bargaining between spouses; often, a more relevant scenario is that of non-cooperative behavior within marriage. This is certainly the most appropriate characterization in the developing countries of South Asia (where divorce is relatively rare), and this is the threat scenario we adopt here. 8 Our empirical results suggest that this threat option is consistent with the data, while divorce as the threat option is not.
Our point of departure in this paper is the observation that the avenues for generating asset and labor incomes for women have different impacts on their labor-leisure trade-off. Consequently, they differently affect women's household public good production. It is well-known that, in developing countries, housework-which may be deemed a household public good-is done largely by women.
By providing a credible means of committing her labor in the non-cooperative threat scenario, the introduction of outside work opportunity for a woman impinges adversely on her spouse's threat utility. Despite reducing her consumption of leisure, the earning of labor income could facilitate a greater increase in her relative bargaining power-her autonomy-than an equivalent increase in her non-labor income. We formalize this claim with a simple model and then investigate its empirical validity.
We also examine the empowerment effects of different forms of labor participation. In particular,
we compare the effect of labour that generates an independent income for women to that of working on the household farm. Although it is widely acknowledged that women are more empowered if they maintain direct control of their earnings, it has been hypothesised that any contribution to an income generating activity potentially increases female autonomy. Based on the premise that female 8 The proportion of individuals divorced in our sample from rural Bangladesh is less than 1%.
autonomy is higher when contributing to traditional subsistence farming, it has been commonly argued that women's status falls in the initial periods of industrialization as the economy sheds its reliance on household subsistence agriculture. 9 If women are confined to the domestic sphere, it is argued, they suffer a decline in status and decision-making power relative to their spouse. However, in a bargaining framework, working on their husbands' farms can only increase women's autonomy if the threat option is improved by this activity. This may not be the case if there does not exist a labour market (as is true in our data from Bangladesh) in which women could work in the event household cooperation breakdown. Therefore, bargaining theory would caution us against concluding that engaging in any income-generating activity (whether it be household or individual production)
should increase female autonomy. We examine this issue empirically and find compelling evidence in support of bargaining theory.
There has been little empirical work directly examining the determinants of female autonomy. 10 Moreover, most research identifies female autonomy with relative measures such as earnings, education, and age, between husbands and wives. These are indirect measures, for they presume unspecified (though reasonable) links to female autonomy. We are, instead, able to exploit a data set collected from the rural area of Matlab in Bangladesh with direct measures of female decision making power within the household. We use information that directly speaks to the extent to which women can make independent decisions on various matters.
Many parts of rural Bangladesh, such as the Matlab area, remain very traditional societies in which social and cultural norms curtail the autonomy of women. The subordination of women in traditional rural Bangladeshi society is powerfully supported by the institution of purdah: a set 9 Refer to the pioneering work by Boserup (1970) . See later work by, among others, Ibraz (1993), Beneria and Sen (1986) , Geisler (1993) , and Vlassoff (1994) . 10 Kantor (2003) is an exception.
of norms and regulations that promote the seclusion of women and enforce their exclusion from public spaces. Amin (1997) documents how purdah, in particular, determines the work patterns of women. She demonstrates that, despite common misconceptions, purdah continues to limit women's opportunities for employment outside of their homestead in rural Bangladesh. Since women are denied access to the labor market in this area, the data afford a unique opportunity to test whether working on the household farm affects female autonomy in these circumstances.
Causality is an issue when identifying the extent to which the independent work activities of women contribute to their autonomy. As Basu (2001) has persuasively argued, the say a woman has in household matters is determined by her earnings but her work activity itself is an outcome of her existing bargaining power. To take care of this possible reverse causality that Basu points to, in our empirical work we are careful to address the endogeneity of women's work activities by using suitable instruments.
Based on the Matlab dataset from Bangladesh, our paper make three contributions to our understanding of female autonomy in developing countries. Firstly, it is shown that the effect of earned income on women's bargaining power is far greater (by an order of magnitude) than that of unearned income. Secondly, it is demonstrated that women who work on the household farm have no more autonomy than those who are housewives, while those do earn independent incomes have considerably greater autonomy. This brings out the importance of controlling income, as opposed to merely contributing to the generation of income, as a crucial determinant of autonomy. Thirdly, our paper provides compelling evidence that noncooperative behavior within marriage is the threat point that is relevant to developing countries. It is this scenario that generates predictions consistent with our empirical results; predictions with divorce as the threat option are refuted by the data.
The next section of this paper spells out a simple theoretical model and the subsequent section derives some empirical implications. Section 4 describes the data. The estimation strategy is then explained in Section 5, and the main empirical results summarized in Section 6. Section 7 presents some concluding thoughts.
The Model
In this section, we write down a simple model that identifies how, in a household setting, earned and unearned income might determine the bargaining power of a woman relative to that of her husband.
We do not argue for the generality of the model we set out; our purpose here is merely to suggest possibilities and to motivate our empirical work. We then investigate the reality of the situation in Bangladesh's Matlab area by examining the data drawn from there.
We assume the wife has three possible uses for her time: producing a household public good (by doing housework), working in an activity that earns her income, and leisure. In the data, almost all women who earn an independent income do not work outside of the home. 11 Since working in the labour market is not an option for these women, we assume this to be the case in the model. Purdah and religious sanctions circumscribe women's mobility. 12 For now, we ignore the possibility of individuals working on the houshold farm; we discuss this possibility in Section 3. The husband has two uses for his time: working in the labour market, and leisure. The husband is assumed not to participate in the production of the household public good. This is consistent with the cultural norms in South Asia and many other developing countries:
housework is relegated to women.
Husbands and wives each have one unit of time endowment. Apart from labour income, they may each have unearned income. We denote by R f and R m , respectively, the exogenous unearned 11 The typical income-earning occupation for women is duck or hen rearing. Around 93% of all working women in the data work inside the home. The remaining few earn wages from outside work on farms, in hospitals or other services. 12 In the data used here, 93% of women have never been to the local bazaar, 92% have never been to the local mosque, and 68% leave their residential compound at most once a week.
income accruing to the wife and the husband.
The utility function of the wife is assumed to be:
where x f and z, respectively, denote the amount of private and household public good she consumes, and l f is her leisure. If the time allocations e 1 f and e 2 f denote, respectively, the time she spends doing housework and working to earn an independent income, her leisure is given by l f = 1 − e 1 f − e 2 f . We normalize the parameters of the wife's utility function so that 0 ≤ β f , γ f , δ f ≤ 1 and β f +γ f +δ f = 1.
An analogous utility function is posited for the husband: We assume that the production function for the household public good uses the wife's labour and the income, y m , contributed by the husband towards household expenses. We assume that the wife contributes only labour in the production of the public good, not income. This commits us to the view that men and women operate in separate spheres, with the provision of financial resources for the household public good falling in the husband's.
Furthermore, we assume that the production function, f (y m , e 1 f ), for the household public good is linear in the inputs:
This simplifying assumption is made to facilitate analytical tractibility, and further discussion on it is provided towards the end of this section.
As is standard in bargaining models, the allocation of resources in the cooperative endeavor here would be determined by the threat utilities of each person. We follow Woolley (1988), LundbergPollak (1993), Chen-Woolley (2001) in positing that the threat scenario is defined by the noncooperative outcome within marriage. This, and not divorce, is the relevant fallback option in the developing countries of South Asia. Utility under this option will determine the degree of autonomy that women can exercise within their households.
We assume that, in the noncooperative scenario, the wife and the husband entertain Nash conjectures regarding the choices of their partner.
The wife's optimization problem in this scenario may be written max
where p f is the price of the wife's private good and w f is the implicit wage rate she earns in her independent income earning activity.
The husband solves
where p m is the price of the husband's private good and w m is the husband's wage rate in the labour market. 13 For the assumed utility function, each person's marginal utilities of consumption for all the goods are unbounded at zero. To sidestep the distracting possibility of zero consumption, we shall assume in what follows that R f and w f are both positive, even though they may be much smaller than R m and w m , respectively.
The wife's best response functions for the amounts of time allocated to household production and to earning an independent income will depend on the amount of financial contribution made by the husband for household expenditures. Likewise, the husband's best response functions for the amount of time spent working, and his financial contribution to the public good, will depend on the amount of time the wife devotes to producing the public good. Given our assumptions regarding preferences and the production technology of the public good, the husband's income contribution (y m ) and the time devoted by the wife to producing the public good (e 1 f ) can be readily shown to be strategic substitutes.
Increases in the wife's unearned income and increases in the implicit wage rate in her independent income earning activity would both be expected to increase her utility in the noncooperative equilibrium. However, there is a basic asymmetry in the manner in which they impinge on her husband's threat utility. We now turn our attention to address this.
The following proposition records the effects on the Nash equilibrium of an increase in the wife's unearned income. (This and the results to follow are proved in Appendix A.) Proposition 1. Suppose the Nash equilibrium is fully interior. Then, in equilibrium, an increase 13 In reality, the husband may own a farm on which he works (possibly with hired labour). If hired labour requires supervision, the implicit wage rate of the husband working his farm would be greater than the market wage he could earn. Furthermore, the larger the amount of land owned the higher would this implicit wage be. Refer to Section 3 for further discussion.
in the wife's unearned income: (a) increases the time she devotes to the production of the public good, (b) reduces the amount of time she devotes to earning income, (c) increases her consumption of leisure, (d) decreases her husband's contribution to the public good, and (e) reduces the amount of time the husband works.
An increase in the wife's rental income, ceteris paribus, would increase her consumption of the private good, lowering its marginal utility. Since she would allocate her time so that its marginal worth is the same in all uses, she would want to increase her consumption of the public good and so increase the time she allocates to its production. The income effect, however, would induce her to consume more leisure. So, on balance, not all the reduction in the time she devotes to earned labour would be diverted to public good production; some of it goes to leisure. Since her time is a substitute for the financial resources her husband provides for the public good, he will curtail some of the income he allocates for the household and divert it to his private consumption-thereby lowering the marginal utility he derives from his private good. This, in turn, would warrant an increase in his consumption of leisure.
The following proposition records the effects on the Nash equilibrium of an increase in the wife's wage rate.
Proposition 2. Suppose the Nash equilibrium is fully interior. Then, in equilibrium, an increase in the wife's implicit wage rate: (a) decreases the amount of time she devotes to the public good, (b) increases her husband's contribution to the public good, (c) increases the amount of time the husband works in the labour market, and (d) decreases the husband's private good consumption.
An increase in the wife's wage rate would induce her to allocate more of her time to earning, raising her marginal utility from leisure. She will offset this partly by reducing the time allocated to public good production, thereby lowering the output of the public good. Her husband will partly compensate for this by contributing more income to the household, curtailing his private consumption. The accompanying increase in the marginal utility of private consumption will induce him to spend more time earning, thereby reducing his leisure. Thus in the noncooperative equilibrium, an increase the wife's wage rate will not only increase the time she devotes to earning but also induce an increase in the husband's market work.
From the above propositions, we immediately obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1: (a) An increase in the wife's unearned income increases the threat utility of both spouses, while (b) an increase in the wife's wage rate increases her threat utility but decreases the husband's.
An increase in the wife's unearned income increases the husband's consumption of the public good, his private good and leisure. So both spouses are better off in the ensuing Nash equilibrium.
When her wage rate increases, however, their utilities move in opposite directions. Because she diverts some time away from public good production, her husband's consumption of the public good, the private good, and leisure all decrease. Consequently, while the wife is better off, her husband is worse off.
It might appear that the result in the above corollary is dependent on the assumption that the wife's time input into the public good and the husband's income contribution are substitutes. This is not so. Even if these inputs were complementary, we would expect these outcomes to obtain.
The only difference is that, when the wife diverts time from public good production, the husband, too, would divert resources away from household expenditures instead of augmenting them. While this response would partly compensate for the decline in his public good consumption, it would not entirely offset it. When the wife's implicit wage rate increases, the husband would still be worse off.
It must be noted that the results stated in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 depend on our assumption of separate spheres, where the wife contributes only her labor but no financial resources towards the public good. If the wife, too, contributes financial resources, these results may not hold. If she starts contributing from her independently earned income, her contribution would increase with her wage rate. The husband would curtail his contribition and divert it his private consumption, so he may be better off.
Let U f and U m denote the (threat) utilities of the wife and husband in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium considered above. Naturally, these will impinge on the cooperative outcome. We posit, as in Basu (2001) , that in their cooperative endeavor, the couple jointly makes its choices to maximize the objective function αU f + (1 − α)U m , with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It is reasonable to suppose that the weight, α, that is put on the wife's utility in the cooperative scenario is a measure of her autonomy within the household. It would be increasing in her threat utility and decreasing in her husband's. Assuming that these utilities are cardinal, we may write: 6) where the function g is increasing in the first argument, decreasing in the second, and bounded between 0 and 1. A reasonable functional form might be
The cooperative outcome is the solution to max
We do not explicitly solve for the cooperative outcome here because our primary interest is in the wife's bargaining power, as captured by α, which is determined by the noncooperative outcome.
Our empirical estimation in subsequent sections seeks to identify the determinants of α.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that a woman's earned income in the noncooperative outcome may have greater potential to contribute to the wife's wellbeing in the cooperative outcome than unearned income. Suppose we consider two alternative scenarios. In one, the wife's unearned income increases by a given amount but the wage rate stays the same. In the second, her unearned income stays the same but her wage rate increases. Suppose we adjust her unearned income in the latter casepossibly taking away some of it-so that, in the Nash equilibrium, her total income increases by the same amount in both cases. Which scenario would lead to a better cooperative outcome for her? The answer is not clear a priori. For equal changes in her income, her utility will naturally be higher when it is due to an increase in unearned income since that comes at no cost to her leisure.
However, it is conceivable that she is actually better off in the cooperative outcome associated with the second scenario because the decline in her husband's threat utility may more than compensate for the reduction in her leisure. For equal increases in the earned and unearned incomes in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the increase in earned income may well confer greater bargaining power on the woman.
Corollary 1 brings out the importance of assuming that the fallback option is within marriage itself-as proposed by Woolley (1988) , Lundberg-Pollak (1993) , and Chen-Woolley (2001)-as opposed to divorce. If the threat utility were determined by their utilities when they are divorced, the wife's utility would be higher and the husband's utility constant whether it is the wife's unearned income or unearned income that increases. Qualitatively, there would be nothing to choose between the two routes to empowering women. Indeed, as argued above, for equal increases in the wife's earned and unearned income, her utility would increase by less in the former case since she has to forego some leisure to bring about the increase in income. Therefore, the divorce option for threat utility would unambiguously predict that, for equal increases in her earned and unearned income, it is unearned income that would have greater quantitative effect on her bargaining power. In Corollary 1, in sharp contrast, the comparative statics on the threat utilities are not identical for the two routes. As we have argued above, it leaves open the possibility that, for equal increases in earned and unearned income, it may be earned income that is more efficacious in raising the wife's bargaining power. Whether, in fact, this is the case is an empirical issue.
Empirical Conjectures
Before we embark on our empirical investigation, we pause to dwell on some of the features present in the data which are not captured in the stark model of the previous section. Many families in the sample engage in cultivation. Farm work can be done with family labour and with hired labour. But family labour has the advantage that it does not require supervision. Put differently, inclusive of supervision costs, family labour is cheaper. This makes the time allocation decision more complicated than we assumed in the previous section. In the cooperative endeavor, the wife has one more use for her time: working on her husband's farm. 14 Similarly, the husband has the option of working on his farm or participating in the labour market.
When the husband's land holdings are very small, the couple would use only family labour to cultivate the farm, and the husband would work in the labour market for some time. 15 An increase in his land holding, for given bargaining power, α, would induce them to use more family labour on his farm. The husband would curtail his time on the labour market and/or his leisure; the wife would cut back her housework and help out at the farm. Thus one would expect to see a positive correlation between the husband's landholdings and farm work of the wife. At even higher levels of farm holdings, in the cooperative solution we would expect the wife to even cut back her independent earning activity. Thus we should observe a negative correlation between husband's landholdings and the wife's independent earning activity. Of course, when the husband's landholdings increase, his threat utility would too (that is, α would decline). This would induce a substitution away from her consumption of the private good and leisure in favour of his. In any event, we would expect the above correlations to still obtain.
When the wife's threat utility increases relative to the husband's, the allocation of their joint resources would tilt in her favour. If the exogenous change that increases her threat utility also brings more resources into the household in the cooperative endeavor-say, through higher unearned income-the husband may become better off, too. The wife's consumption of her private good and leisure would certainly increase. Her consumption of the public good would, too, but may require more of her effort. So we would expect to see a diversion of her labour effort towards housework from farm work or from her independent earning activity when her unearned income increases. To the extent that the income of the family is higher, the couple may substitute financial resources for the wife's time in housework. This could entail the hiring of domestic servants and/or a greater reliance on household gadgets. When her threat utility is very high (possibly because she has considerable wealth or education), we could well expect to see the wife only overseeing the production of the household public good.
When we take the theory to the data, we encounter the difficulty that what we observe in the data is the cooperative outcome. We do not see the threat scenario. How do we know that, in fact, we are not observing the noncooperative outcome? In a world in which there is no asymmetric information (as we presume) between husband and wife, it is reasonable to expect that we would observe the cooperative outcome. (This is the same reason that we would not expect strikes to occur in firms when union and management have access to the same information.) The noncooperative outcome would be the fallback position that supports this cooperative outcome. We assume this to be the case.
There is a further difficulty. While it is not hard to identify most of the ingredients of the threat outcome (like education, assets, position in the hierarchy within the household, etc. of the two spouses), we cannot observe the activities each member of the couple would undertake in the noncooperative equilibrium. We need to make some assumptions regarding how the observed activities in the cooperative outcome would map into activities in the event cooperation breaks down.
To address this issue, we posit that the independent income earning activity of women (duck-hen rearing) requires some irreversible investment. If a woman is observed to engage in this activity, we assume that she would continue in this activity should cooperation break down. This is because the infrastructure is already in place and the costs associated with it are sunk. Moreover, by engaging in this activity, the woman would have acquired the skills needed to earn an independent income. If, however, she is observed to work on her husband's farm in the cooperative outcome, we presume that production of the household public good is the only activity she could engage in were negotiations to break down between the couple. This is because working in the farm gives her no marketable skills-women in the Matlab area could not sell their services in the labour market.
The upshot of the argument made above is that there should be no fundamental difference between the threat utilities of women who are observed in the cooperative endeavour to be pure housewives and those working on the husbands' farms. In the noncooperative outcome, these women would have
the same options open to them and, therefore, would be engaged in the same activities. Since their autonomy is determined by their threat utilities, empirical measures of autonomy should be the same for women who are purely housewives and those who work on their husbands' farms. And these, in turn, should be definitely lower than the measures for women who are observed to earn independent incomes. Therefore our first empirical conjecture is:
Conjecture 1 Female autonomy, α, is (a) the the same for women who work on their husband's farm compared to women who are housewives, and (b) higher for women who earn an independent income compared to women who are housewives.
Our second main empirical conjecture follows from the analysis of Section 2. There, Corollary 1 implies:
Conjecture 2 Female autonomy, α, is (a) increasing in both earned and unearned income of women, but (b) the impact of earned income may be larger than the impact of unearned income.
This conjecture, informed by the simple theory presented in the previous section, captures the essential asymmetry between earned and unearned income in empowering women.
We now turn to testing Conjectures 1 and 2 with the data.
Data
The household level data used in this study are from the Matlab Health and Socio Economic Survey (MHSS) conducted in 1996. 16 The survey gathered information from approximately 4364 households in 2687 residential compounds (baris) in Matlab, a rural subdistrict (Thana) in Chandpur Zila (Chittagong division) of Bangladesh. 17 Matlab is located about 70 kilometers southeast of Dhaka.
The area is low-lying and the economy is largely based on agriculture. The data contain detailed 16 For details, refer to Rahman et al. (1999) . 17 Bari is the basic unit of social organization in Matlab. Bari translates to homestead but commonly refers to a cluster of households in close physical proximity. Heads of the households on a bari are typically related and the interdependence of the households on baris is an important aspect of life in rural Bangladesh (see, for example, Foster (1993)).
information on the education, income, assets, and all labor activity of individuals. In addition to this more standard information, women were asked numerous questions aiming to capture their degree of independence or autonomy within the household. We consider only married individuals living together with their spouse, who form a sample of roughly 3700 couples. 18 The Annual earnings are reported conditional on working for an independent income. Similarly total value of land is reported conditional on owning land. Both men and women have typically inherited the land that they own. 20 The work activities of individuals are their primary work activities. 21 As seen from Table 1 , men are older, more educated, earn more and own more land than their wives.
The majority of couples sampled constitute the household head and his wife. That is, the typical 18 Approximately 10% of married women are not living with their spouse. Almost all marriages are arranged (98%) and there is no polygyny in the data. 19 Standard deviations are in parentheses. Income values are in takas. There were approximately 45 takas to the U.S. dollar in 1996. 20 As specified by Islamic Law, daughters have the right to inherit the equivalent of half a son's share of the father's property in Bangladesh. However, this is rarely enforced in practice. 21 A significant proportion (approximately 40% of both women and men) also have secondary activities.
household is nuclear; only 7% of the women in the sample have entered a household by marrying the son of the household's head. 22 The no work category for women reflects a woman who is primarily a housewife. Women who work at home towards household income are working on the household farm, mainly performing the task of husking paddy (78%). 23 Women who work for an independent income are generally still working at home but they typically earn an independent income from duck-hen rearing (84%). 24 The few men who are not working are generally retired. Of the men who work at home, 75% are self cultivators; the remaining operate small businesses. The men who earn independent earnings are agricultural labourers (27%), run small businesses such as a grocery shop (18%), perform skilled labour like a rickshaw driver or fisherman (19%), or work for a government service (20%). Working for the government generates the highest income on average, followed by working in a business, which typically generates more than what a skilled worker earns. Labourers earn the least. Land ownership seems to be the primary determinant of the work activity of both men and women. The more land a household owns, the more likely that the man is a self cultivator and that his wife also works on the farm, as consistent with the model, as discussed in Section 3.
The table below lists the summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of the household characteristics.
22 This is common in Bangladesh where related adult males reside in independent households but within the same bari (residential compound). 23 The remaining ones are rearing animals or helping in their husband's work. 24 The remaining few women earn an income from handicrafts, working in a factory, or in farm labour. In the survey, women were asked (in the absence of other family members) if they needed to seek permission to make various purchases. The first three variables in Table 3 25 It was the husband's money that was used to make these purchases. Therefore, the various responses speak to the degree of independence women exercise with regard to the allocation of their husbands' incomes.
Estimation Strategy
Conjectures 1 and 2 of Section 3 provide testable predictions on the determinants of female autonomy, α. Let A denote an index function such that A = 1 if a woman has autonomy with respect to a given 25 No women in the sample claimed that only their own money is used for these purchases and approximately 4% claimed that they contributed some of their own money to buy these items.
decision, and A = 0 otherwise. This function is represented by the following:
The vector X A contains exogenous variables which affect the threat utilities of husbands and wives, U m and U f . These include husband and wife characteristics such as age, education, land ownership (or unearned income), and also wife's relationship to the head of the household. The threat utilities are also functions of a wife's earned income in the noncooperative scenario. However, as pointed out in Section 3, what we observe in the data is the cooperative outcome with respect to the work activity of women. As argued earlier, we use the observed cooperative outcomes to infer the activities in the noncooperative equilibrium. In (5.1), ε A is the error term.
The variables that pertain to the work activity decisions within the household, however, are and health shocks the family suffered less than two years ago (as summarized in Table 3 ). The conjecture is that, if the household suffered a crop loss, female labour would have been reallocated to the farm. Alternatively, if a family member fell ill (other than the husband or wife), then women would have withdrawn their labour from income-generating activities to care for the sick instead. So these instrumental variables will be correlated with women's work activities and earnings but not directly with their autonomy.
Estimation Results
The results from the first stage estimations are listed in the table below. The first two columns are the results from a multinomial logit estimation on the work activity of women, where the comparison group is no work (i.e., housewife). The third column is a tobit estimation on the annual independent earnings of women. A chief determinant of whether a woman works is the amount of land her husband owns and whether the household cultivates paddy; her own land holding has no significant effect on her work activity or her earned income. As might be expected, the labour force participation of women bears a strictly concave relationship to their age. The education of women does not seem to determine whether they work, but it is a positive determinant of their annual earnings. Women with more educated husbands are less likely to work on the family farm and more likely to be primarily housewives.
The probability that a woman works (either on the farm or for an independent income) is positively related to the number of children in the household. For women with children, engaging only in housework seems to be an inferior option. Household size is negatively related to wage employment and earnings; the larger the number of adults in the household, the less inclined are women to earn an independent income. If a family member suffered a health shock, women are less likely to be working for independent incomes. If the household suffered a crop shock within the last two years, women are more likely to be working on the family farm in order to compensate. These instrumental variables are jointly significant at the 5% level.
The results from the second stage estimation of (5.1) are listed in the tables below for several indicators of female autonomy. First we consider decision making power with respect to smaller purchases (cooking oil, coconut oil, and ice cream), as described in Table 3 , then for larger purchases (bazaar, betel leaf, children's clothining, and sarees). Linear probability models are estimated which included the predicted values from the estimation results in Table 4 . The first two tables include the predicted work activities of women as independent variables. The subsequent two tables list the results from analogous estimations where we instead include predicted women's earnings. Table 5a -IV-2SLS Estimations of indicators of female autonomy 27
As the model predicts, women's outside options, as reflected by their landholdings, are positively related to their autonomy. Similarly, working for an independent income is a significant and positive determinant. Perhaps a more surprising result is that working on the farm has no impact on female autonomy, compared to not working in any income generating activity. This is consistent with Conjecture 1 of Section 3 In general, husbands' characteristics do not significantly affect women's autonomy. We found this to be true also in several empirical specifications where we also included variables reflecting the work activity of husbands. We see from the above table that household (family) income is also an insignificant determinant of female autonomy. With respect to women's position in the household, the left out category is daughter-in-law. As we might expect, relative to this category, being the spouse of the head, the actual head, a daughter, or the head's mother has a 27 Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms clustered at the village level.
positive effect on a woman's autonomy with respect to household decision making. 
Table 5b -IV-2SLS Estimations of indicators of female autonomy
We see from Table 5b that the main results also hold for autonomy with respect to making larger purchases in the household. In a few cases (the purchase of either sarees and children's clothing), the education of women also affects their decision making power. The results for women's work activity suggest that only if a woman has income in her hands (i.e., earns income directly), does it impact on the autonomy with which she can spend her husband's income.
The two subsequent tables list the results from analogous estimations where we instead include women's earnings. The results from the first stage of this estimation are listed in column 3 of Table   4 . 
Table 5c -IV-2SLS Estimations of indicators of female autonomy
The results from the above table are essentially consistent with those in Table 5a 29 .
Before we can examine whether labour earnings have greater impact on women's autonomy than asset income, we need to obtain the latter from the estimated coefficent for value of woman's land. If we assume perfect capital markets in which the interest rate is r, the rental income associated with an asset of value V would be rV . If b β W is the coefficient associated with the value of woman's land, then that associated with her rental (unearned) income from land would be b β W /r. It is this number that must be compared with the estimated coefficient for a woman's labour income. For the three columns in Table 5c , we see that the impact of a woman's labour income on her autonomy is greater than that of her rental income if r > 4.7%. 
Table 5d -IV-2SLS Estimations of indicators of female autonomy
The results from Table 5d (for larger purchases) are essentially consistent with those in Table   5b . For the four columns in Table 5d , we see that the impact of a woman's labour income is greater than that of her rental income if r > 3.0%.
It is possible to get an idea of the relevant interest rates from the Matlab data. People who borrowed money paid an average annual interest rate that exceeded 70% if they borrowed from relatives and over 44% if they borrowed from others (private commercial banks, cooperative banks, etc.). 30 The lower interest rate charged by financial institutions is presumably because they invariably asked for collateral. Since the annual inflation rate in Bangladesh in 1996-97 was 3.9%, the real interest rate was around 40%. Thus, for this interest rate, our estimates from Tables 5c and 5d indicate that the impact of labour income on a woman's autonomy is an order of magnitude higher than that of rental income. This relationship is consistent with Conjecture 2 from Section 3.
The main results from Tables 5a to 5d farm work by women is seen to have absolutely no effect on their autonomy. Our procedure assures us that the correlation between independent earnings on women's autonomy is indeed capturing the causality from the former to the latter, and not the reverse.
Alternative Measures of Female Autonomy
The empirical results of this paper appear to support Conjectures 1 and 2 of the theoretical model.
The main finding is that income directly in the hands of women has a significant impact on her decision making power within the household. This result does not simply follow because a woman who is earning income is directly making purchases with that income. As mentioned in Section 4, for all of the possible purchases analysed here, it is almost always the husbands' income which is used. Therefore, the key dependent variables analyzed here truly capture female autonomy, and do not merely reflect the fact that women can spend more because they have more.
Below we perform similar estimations in which the dependent variables are alternative measures of autonomy such as wearing a burqa. In these estimations, the variables reflecting their work activity or their income (earned and unearned) have no significant impact women's autonomy. This demonstrates that their work activity impinges on their autonomy in the economic sphere (that is, their clout in allocating resources) but hardly at all in the cultural and religious spheres. We see from Table 6 that almost all women seem to cover their head inside and outside of their bari (residential compound) in the presence of men and typically do not eat their meals with their husband. Only the activity of wearing a burqua exhibits some variation. We report below estimations analogous to those in Tables 5a and 5b , for only those variables in Table 6 These results stand in sharp contrast to those in Tables 5a and 5b . Wearing a burqua is positively correlated to the age and education of both members of the couple and also to the land ownership and education of the husband. The work activity of women and their own land ownership have no signficant effects on the dependent variables. Though not reported, female labour earnings also had no effect.
Our results indicate that the key dependent variables analysed in Tables 5a to 5d strongly impinge on female autonomy in the realm of economic decision making within the household. There is no evidence, however, that this influence extends beyond the economic sphere; norms determined by cultural, social, and religious factors seem to be relatively impervious to this influence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first set out a simple model to address the issue of whether it is earned income or unearned income that is more effective in enhancing the autonomy of women within the household.
Our model offered a reason to favor earned income. We find evidence from the Matlab area of
Bangladesh that is consistent with this: labor income is seen to have a larger effect on women's autonomy than does rental income from the land they own. open the possibility that women may benefit more from earned income than they could from unearned income; divorce as the threat scenario, in contrast, unambiguously points to unearned income as more efficacious.
Our empirical work also reveals that employment on their husbands' farms gave Bangladeshi women no more autonomy than doing housework. A woman's housework is deemed a household public service; her work on the farm, our results suggest, is deemed to be of no additional worthdespite the fact that the latter generates income. That women's participation in income-generation does not necessarily have a salutary effect on their autonomy may come as no surprise to economists, who would argue that what does not impinge on the threat option should have no effect on autonomy.
Nevertheless, the robustness of this finding-as reassuring as it may be to economists-reveals an aspect of the bleak reality confronting women in developing countries. Women working on their husbands' farms appear to exercise no control over the income they help generate. It is when the income is possessed by women that it contributes to their autonomy. These findings are consistent with those of Kantor (2003) , who found in the context of women working in the Indian garment industry in the city of Ahmedabad, that home-based work did not empower women much. Possession, it would appear, is more than nine-tenths of the law that determines women's autonomy. Having said this, we must mention that, in the Matlab data, we do not know whether women maintained direct control over their earnings. If they did not, our findings suggest that the efficacy of earnings is even greater: the mere possibility of controlling their own earnings in the noncooperative outcome within marriage is sufficient to increase women's autonomy. 
